The Ming Zheng, 1652

It's ridiculous that all the real people in the family like to read anti-Japanese novels, but on the contrary, some unsavory pornographic stories are posted on the Internet every day.

Pirates guard the country's gates, while rogue bandits die in the country.

In history, after an army is defeated, it is impossible to fight again, and it is almost determined by word of mouth. For example, Fu Jian after the Battle of Feishui and Zhao Guangyi, the God of Chariots on the Gaoliang River. However, the Eight Banners soldiers described by the author were able to defend the isolated city after a major defeat, but all of them died in battle and killed twice as many enemy troops. What kind of war god is this? ? ? To put it bluntly, the author did not replace Xiao Bing, and did not treat Xiao Bing as an individual. In ancient times, most armies would collapse if the death rate was 5%. If the death rate was 10%, they would be considered elite. The Song Dynasty once ambushed the Jin army envoys, and 3,000 people were defeated by 9 people. Why? Because although the Song army has a large number of people, it is completely unable to handle heavy cavalry, even if there are only 9. There are many ants that kill elephants, but who is willing to be a dead ant? In the late Ming Dynasty, why did an army become more powerful after surrendering to the Manchus? This is not just full pay, but also a supervising team. More importantly, everyone knows that the Eight Banners can definitely defeat the Ming army and the peasant army. Military morale is the most important thing. Author, put yourself in my shoes. You are a small soldier. You have just been defeated and now you have to defend the city. Will you fight to the death and work for the court, or will you fish secretly and take the opportunity to surrender? Unless you have faith, ants can still survive, let alone humans?

Yesterday, a book friend suggested setting up a book club group. The author thought it would be no problem at first, but when I got home and was about to start one, I suddenly remembered that the book club group was empty when I was writing on the small site two years ago, so I still wanted to see everyone's wishes, so as not to end up with no one talking in the group, which would be embarrassing. If book friends want to form a group, please give me a like for this book review. If there are fifteen people, we will create one. The author is mainly worried that there will be a group in the end, but if there are only three or five people and no one says anything, it will defeat the original intention of establishing the group.

I think this is what many people, including me, think - not that "the Ming Dynasty itself consciously gave birth to the buds of capitalism or a relatively mature market economy", but that "the Ming Dynasty's system had some prerequisites for the growth of a market economy, and the gradual decline of government power was conducive to the growth of the buds of capitalism." Judging from the increasing number of historical materials of the early Ming Dynasty, it cannot be concluded that the Ming Dynasty was the so-called "suppression of commerce" in terms of institutional design. On the contrary, the institutional design of the early Ming Dynasty was more friendly to small and medium-sized industrial and commercial operators and had lighter controls than previous generations. Especially compared with the Song Dynasty, a large number of formerly government-owned fields, such as ironmaking, were opened to the private sector. The private economy in the Ming Dynasty was more active than in the previous generation. But on the other hand, as a feudal dynasty, it is not happy to see the power of industrial and commercial merchants increase too much, which is not conducive to rule based on the basic principle of household registration and equalization of the people. Due to national defense and financial requirements, it will also force industrial and commercial operators to engage in some non-market economic behaviors, especially in the field of salt tea monopoly in the Ming Dynasty. To some extent, it is official forced buying and selling. As a dynasty that tended to adopt conservative fiscal policies, the physical tax system prevailed in the early and middle Ming Dynasties, and the official had no interest in pioneering undertakings such as coinage, mining, and ocean-going trade, all of which were not conducive to the development of a market economy. With the contraction of official administrative power in the socio-economic field in the mid-to-late Ming Dynasty, the abolition of the monopoly system, concessions in maritime trade management, and the monetization reform of the fiscal system, all further promoted the growth of budding capitalism. However, this promotion was not a conscious leading behavior of the Ming officials, but rather a passive adaptation of administrative agencies as they declined in control of the socio-economic field. To put it more bluntly, the greater the possibility that China would complete the transformation of capitalism in the mid-to-late 17th century, the less likely it would be that the existing system framework of the Ming Dynasty or the Ming Dynasty could exist. The problem lies behind, "But the "bourgeois" consciousness of the merchants in the Jiangnan area in the late Ming Dynasty has not awakened. No merchant or chamber of commerce has ever felt the constraints and obstacles of the authoritarian forces to a certain extent. Its gradually expanding strength has further forced the feudal authoritarians to submit to it and seek ways to compromise with it." - I have some disagreement with this point of view. The main difference is that I think we cannot fully pursue the Western perspective on this issue, while the domestic perspective is currently too focused on the trends in Jiangnan. First, in the late Ming Dynasty, Jiangnan merchants actively moved closer to the "shi" class. This does not constitute a counter-evidence. The social conditions in the East and the West are very different. The relatively strong urban autonomy system in the West, and the powerful feudal system where monarchs often relied on the citizenry to fight against the nobility, made Western European merchants more powerful. However, I think their tendency to actively seek to unite with the aristocrats under the old system is not essentially different from the Chinese merchants' tendency to actively move closer to the "shi" class. In the development path of Western capitalism, capital merchants and feudal aristocrats are not diametrically opposed. Whether it is the Glorious Revolution or the French Revolution, the outcome is not so much that the bourgeoisie eliminated the feudal landlords, but that the two sides compromised after the revolutionary forces re-established the feudal ruling class. Similarly, Jiangnan merchants actively sought to cooperate with the scholar class who held state power in the Song and Ming Dynasties, and even became a part of the scholar class. As long as their main economic activities are still related to the market economy, it cannot be said that they have given up on transforming into an "autonomous" bourgeoisie. Second, I also admit that Jiangnan businessmen cannot become "conscious bourgeois". The reason is not that they are closer to "shi", but that this group of people is indeed too weak and lacks the ambition to engage in violence. To force feudal despotism to compromise with the bourgeoisie, violence (especially in Eastern countries) is an essential factor. Only by mastering violence can we have the final say. However, the possibility that Jiangnan merchants did not exist does not mean that merchants in other areas of the Ming Dynasty did not have attempts and attempts to master violence. If we turn our perspective to Fujian, what will be the observation results? Benefiting from the booming global trade that began in the 15th century, Fujian maritime merchants obviously had more pioneering spirit (reflected in the large-scale immigration activities in Southeast Asia), and were more conscious of using violence to seek power for themselves. From Wang to Zheng Chenggong, although this group had many immaturities and could not escape the restriction of "killing and arson are subject to recruitment", it used violence time and time again to protect its rights and interests, and it got closer to the core of power every time. By the end of the Ming Dynasty, whether Zheng Zhilong intended it or not, the final form of the Zheng Group was a behemoth with tens of thousands of soldiers, thousands of ships, one department and two generals. The successors were educated by leaders in the southeastern literary world, spanning the military, political and financial circles. Later, they even dominated the political situation in Longwu for a time. At this point, can we still say with complete certainty that the bourgeoisie in the late Ming Dynasty did not possess "consciousness" at all? Third, some views on the organizational form of Zheng Ming Group. What is particularly noteworthy, and what Gu Cheng also specifically mentioned in the history of the Southern Ming Dynasty, is that the financial system of the Zheng Ming Group contains some new possibilities. To put it simply, the result of the Zhengming Group's financial dependence on sea trade is that its efficiency far exceeds that of the traditional farming dynasty. Xiamen can support a powerful navy and at least 50,000 to 60,000 full-time soldiers. This is completely unimaginable for the traditional Chinese government, which is based on farming activities. The gap between the Shu Han and Cao Wei was only ten times, and the gap in size between the Manchu and Qing Dynasties and the Zheng Ming regime was no less than a hundred times. However, facing Zheng Ming for a long time, they were completely helpless, and even had to adopt a sea ban that killed eight enemies and suffered a thousand losses to completely cut off Zheng Ming's financial resources. If the Zheng Ming regime can survive for a long time, I think the efficiency and flexibility of its fiscal system will inevitably be focused on. China's fiscal system is likely to lead to a result that is more conducive to the market economy. Another point worth noting is that this group is more open and international. As a local government, Zheng Ming is unique in having historical materials describing its activities from Japanese, Portuguese, Dutch and British perspectives. Returning to the problem itself, there is no doubt that the Manchu Qing's entry into the customs dealt a heavy blow to the development of China's capitalism. Not only was it reflected in the destruction of productivity by the war, but the thorough maritime ban policy in the early and middle Qing Dynasties also dealt a heavy blow to the southeastern market economy. Not only did China's first political and economic regime that had just formed a bourgeois prototype completely fail, but the originally booming maritime trade economy did not develop again until the end of Kangxi's reign. In addition, to some extent, it can be regarded as "learning" the "lessons" of the previous Ming Dynasty. Qingchao has increased the control of private economic activities, and the form of combining government and business has become more common. But then again, it cannot be said that the argument that Chinese businessmen do not have the "consciousness" of being a bourgeoisie is wrong. Otherwise, Zheng Zhilong should be the founder of the country instead of a clown who was humiliated and killed by the Manchus. Or the inertia of tradition is still too great, so that when the opportunity of history comes, its leading figures themselves do not believe that they have the opportunity to lead a new group to officially enter the historical stage as a leader, but choose to escape shamefully. Although his son Guo Xing was aware of the possibility of this kind of destiny, the opportunity of history has been handed over to others, and after all Guo Xing was not a person with amazing talents like Li Erfeng nor did he have the conditions that Li Erfeng had. However, it cannot be denied that there is such a possibility in the late Ming Dynasty. Under the repeated advice of his brother and son, Zheng Zhilong finally made up his mind, just like he betrayed Yan Siqi and became independent, he once again devoted all his wealth to participate in a world-wide gamble, and China's history turned around. PS: In fact, I just want to see the second Li Er. Think about it if there is the following record, how happy it would be to hear it. Ningshi Taizong's Annals: At that time, Taizu granted Zheng the hereditary title of King of Zhang and Zheng Shimo as King of Chao. The ministers invited him to join the vassal, but the superior refused. The two of them had always been at odds with the prince and made frequent bad remarks. In the first month of the Yuan Dynasty, at the invitation of King Zhang, the prince went to the palace to have a drink to clear up the rift between the brothers. When he returned to the palace, he vomited more than three liters of blood. Chen Yonghua, a close minister, said to Taizong: "Li Jiancheng's affairs are not far away." Taizong was puzzled for a long time. Geng Shen, Cheng Cheng Shuai Zhou Quanbin and others entered and ambushed at Yifeng Gate. Hereditary and Shimo realized the change at the door and wanted to return to the palace. Cheng Cheng jumped out on his horse and shot Cheng Cheng with a gun to kill Cheng Shimo. Shimo fought back with the gun and hit the successful horse. Successfully fell from the horse and could not get up. Shimo When Fang wanted to step forward, Quan Bin jumped on his horse and cut off his horse's legs, and then beheaded him with a sword. The guards of the royal palace persuaded Gan Hui to go to the Xuanwu Lake to guard him. "The prince said to him: "The prince caused chaos with King Zhang and King Chao, so he raised his troops to kill them. In order to avoid alarming His Majesty, he sent his ministers to guard. The superior said to Qian Qianyi and others, "If you don't plan on seeing this today, what should you do?" Qian Qianyi said, "Hereditary inheritance and world silence do not predict righteousness, and they have no merit in the world. The prince has high achievements and high prestige, and is a treacherous conspiracy." Now that the prince has been challenged and executed, the prince's achievements have surpassed the universe and led the country to return to his heart. If your majesty punishes you with good intentions and entrusts state affairs, there will be no more trouble. "Shang said: "Good! This is my long-cherished intention. Or it may be said: Taizong's concubine Pei was a beautiful woman from Taixi, and she was the hereditary concubine of Zheng before entering the palace. "

Zheng Chenggong is actually worse than Li Dingguo, because he took over Taiwan and became a god because of the late Manchu Qing Dynasty. He was almost at the end of his rope, but he still managed to defeat the Dutch and take back Taiwan. The siege of Nanjing may be his stain, because he lost 70 to 80% of his strength and accumulated it over the years because of his carelessness.

In my opinion, in order to complete the historical mission of the late Ming Dynasty, that is, to save the people from the Qing Dynasty and prevent the loss of clothes and clothes, there are only about two ways to go. One is to occupy Zheng Zhilong's ecological niche, or directly travel to become Zheng Sen himself, unify the Nanyang and Dongyang maritime forces in the late Ming Dynasty, complete internal integration, and try to reverse the madness in the Southern Ming Dynasty. Lan, with Zheng Chenggong's strong financial capabilities in the maritime trade of Dongning, Taiwan, and the protagonist forces who have not experienced Zheng Zhilong's rebellion, both in terms of environment and geography, are better than Zheng Chenggong in the original time and space. When the time comes to establish the Bafu regime, not to mention Yu Wentai, Gao Yang, and Liu Song Emperor Wu, it will be a Huan Wen career. The other one is Li Zicheng, Zhang Xianzhong and Sun Kewang, who fought their way out of tens of millions of people, seized the opportunity of the great development of the peasant army in Henan after 1639, established the political power faster than Li Zicheng, and completed the regularization of the army. Of course, if the time traveler himself is not as good as Li Zicheng in strategic vision, then it is better to go to bed as soon as possible. Of course, you don't have to be the leader independently. You can choose to attach yourself to Li Zicheng, Zhang Xianzhong, and Luo Rucai. Under the wings of these heroes, wait for the opportunity to seize the leadership of the group. Sun Kewang from the original time and space is the best example. Similar operations in Mingchuan novels include Li Chonger (Li Zicheng's force) who does not seek to survive in the late Ming Dynasty.

Everything else is fine, but there are too many street fights. Generally speaking, once the city is breached and the city gate is breached, the overall situation is basically decided. The remaining green camp soldiers should surrender in large numbers instead of engaging in street fights with the protagonist's soldiers and horses. How many taels of silver a month do you have to be so desperate? Especially this kind of feudal army. Compare the situation when Manchuria occupied the Central Plains. Because the protagonist has not yet gained a strategic advantage, it is normal that there will be no formal surrender. But if the main force is destroyed, there should be a lot of surrenders.

Why do I feel that Qidian's books are getting weirder and weirder? Many of the good topics in the past have been closed down, and the books written now also have a template feel. Fortunately, there are not many, so this one and another history book are pretty good.

The failure of the Mingzheng Group is the most regrettable. . It is indeed a pity that the opportunity to gain sea power and enter the mainstream of the world was missed like this!